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Abstract
It is usual to rank the participant countries in the Olympic Games in accordance with the number of medals they
have won. An alternative ranking is suggested in this paper. This ranking is based on each countrys ability to win
medals in relation to its available resources. This is an eﬃciency that can be measured with the help of data envelopment
analysis (DEA) for which two models exist: the traditional DEA model, that takes into account variable returns to
scale, and a DEA model based on the premise that the sum of the gains is zero (constant sum of outputs). It is the latter
that is developed in this paper.
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1. Introduction
The Olympic Games were born in ancient
Greece and were designed for individual contests.
However, the cities from where the winners
originated would grant them numerous preroga-
tives, clearly showing that the city felt it had won
as well. The modern Games, initiated in 1896 by
Baron Coubertin, tried to keep the initial spirit of
individual competition. That purpose clearly
failed. Ever since the very ﬁrst modern Games, it
became usual to play the national anthem of the
winners country. During the Cold War the na-
tional character of the contest became ever more
noticeable and developed into a true battle be-
tween East and West. Even before that, the Third
Reich had tried to show the supremacy of the
Arian race in the Games of 1936, although the
results were quite diﬀerent from those Hitler had
bargained for.
In spite of the real competition between na-
tions, the Olympic Committee has never published
an oﬃcial ranking that would allow a country to
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be classed as the overall Olympic Games winner.
The media, however, did so in a way discussed
below and which has become the quasi-oﬃcial
ranking.
Olympic rankings are traditionally published as
a table in which countries are ranked in accor-
dance with the number of gold, silver and bronze
medals their athletes have won. This type of
ranking is typical of the lexicographic multicrite-
ria method (Barba-Romero and Pomerol, 1997),
which, in this particular case, has the disadvantage
to overvalue the gold medal. In other words,
countries that win a high number of silver and
bronze medals but none of gold are ranked below
countries that have won a single gold medal. This
method assumes that the decision-maker has the
ability to rank criteria in accordance to their per-
ceived importance. So the ranking depends on
which criterion is thought to be the most impor-
tant regardless of the other criteria. Should there
be a tie, the ranking follows the second most im-
portant criterion and if a new tie obtains, it follows
the third until the ranking is completed. In the case
of the Olympic ranking, the ﬁrst criterion is the
number of gold metals, the second those of silver
and, ﬁnally, those of bronze.
This paper proposes a diﬀerent ranking based
on data development analysis and analyses the
results of Sidney 2000 Olympic Games. It consid-
ers the number of all types of medals won by each
country as outputs and the population and GDP
of that country as resources to win those medals.
The decision making units (DMUs) are those
countries that win at least one medal in Sidney
2000 Olympic Games. A new data envelopment
analysis (DEA) model is required because the total
number of medals to be won is constant. The
classic DEA model is used as starting point for the
development and use of the modiﬁed model that is
henceforth called the zero sum gains DEA model
(ZSG-DEA).
2. Olympic eﬃciency analysis: Use of traditional
data envelopment analysis
The aim of DEA, proposed by Charnes et al.
(1978), is to compare a certain number of DMUs
that perform similar tasks but which use a diﬀerent
level of inputs to achieve diﬀerent level of outputs.
Besides identifying eﬃcient DMUs, DEA models
allow ineﬃciencies to be measured and diagnosed.
It also determines a piece-wise linear production
function that provides a benchmark for ineﬃcient
DMUs.
In this paper, we use variable returns to scale
DEA model––DEA BCC––(Banker et al., 1984),
because there is no evidence of any proportionality
between inputs and outputs. An output-oriented
model has been adopted because the obvious aim
for every country is to win as many medals as
possible.
As for the choice of inputs, it has been as-
sumed that the greater the population of a
country the better are the chances to produce
good athletes and, therefore, to win medals. The
existence of good athletes per se may be insuf-
ﬁcient; the proper conditions for their training
and improvement of their capacities have to be
provided as well. The richer the country the
easier it will be for these conditions to be met.
Thus, inputs are a countrys population and its
wealth.
While country populations are easily obtain-
able data, their wealth can be measured in ac-
cordance with several criteria. However, only a
couple of them allow adequate comparisons to
be made. The best known and most usual is
the countrys total production excluding exports
and imports that is called the gross domestic
product (GDP). The comparison between the
GDP of diﬀerent countries provides a reasonably
approximate measure of their relative levels of
wealth. However, GDP as such presents some
distortions, one of them being that the level of
prices is diﬀerent from country to country. To
compensate for this deﬁciency, a ﬁctitious ex-
change rate is used that takes into account the
relative diﬀerence in prices and thus establishes
the rate of exchange at purchasing power parity
(PPP). Although GDP at PPP is available for
many countries, the authors have had to estimate
its value for some others.
In this paper, we have considered using ei-
ther GDP or GDP per capita, but ultimately
opted for GDP, given that the magnitude of
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governmental support to Olympic sports should be
better explained by the former. We realised that
a country with a large GDP per capita and a
small population could have enough rich people
but not big enough investments in sports. On
the other hand, a country with a small GDP per
capita but a large total GDP, could have more
resources to invest in sports, although its people
are poorer.
Another variable that could have been used as
input is the countrys investment in sports. This is
a diﬃcult ﬁgure to have reliable access to and, for
that reason, was discarded.
Original DEA models (Cooper et al., 2000) al-
low each DMU to choose in complete freedom the
weight for each output. This may mean that the
eﬃciency score of some DMUs will depend on
having valued the silver or bronze medals more
highly than the gold one. To avoid this kind of
distortion, a model with weight restrictions is used
(Andersen and Petersen, 1993) that implies that
the weight assigned to the output ‘‘number of gold
medals’’ is higher than or equal to the one for the
‘‘number of silver medals’’. The same holds for
silver and bronze medals.
Let it be recalled that in the traditional DEA
models there is a number of reference units whose
inputs and outputs deﬁne the eﬃciency frontier.
The aim is to make the less eﬃcient object unit at
least as eﬃcient as the others by increasing its
output and, thus, join the frontier.
The BCC envelope model with weight restric-
tions as applied to the Olympic Games is here
represented by the set of expressions (I). In this
model, DMU0 is the object unit that is at-
tempting to increase its output; DMUj are the
reference units used to establish the eﬃciency fron-
tier for DMU0. The eﬃciency of DMU0 is 1=h0;
xPOPj and xGDPj are the population and GDP
PPP inputs for each DMUj; yGj, ySj and yBj are
the number of gold, silver and bronze medals
outputs for each DMUj; c1, and c2 are the de-
cision variables that express the weight restric-
tions (Lins and Silva, 2001). As DMU0 becomes
eﬃcient it is projected on to the frontier. This is
DMU0s target, and kj is each eﬃcient DMUjs
individual share in the deﬁnition of the target for
DMU0.
max h0
s:t:
X
j
kjxPOPj6 xPOP0
X
j
kjxGDPj6 xGDP0
h0yG06
X
j
kjyGj  c1
h0yS06
X
j
kjySj þ c1  c2
h0yB06
X
j
kjyBj þ c2X
j
kj ¼ 1
kj; c1; c2 P 0
ðIÞ
Among the 80 countries that have won at least
one medal, 7 result eﬃcient in this model, i.e., they
have won the number of medals compatible with
their potentialities: Australia, Bahamas, Barbados,
Cuba, United States, Macedonia and Russia. Of
these, Barbados and Macedonia did not win gold
medals and their inclusion among eﬃcient coun-
tries is caused by a characteristic of the DEA
model (DMUs with fewer resources are considered
eﬃcient regardless of their results).
The here above applied DEA model assumes
that there is complete output independence, i.e., the
output of any given DMU does not aﬀect the out-
put of the others. When outputs are ranks in con-
tests, this independence does not exist: the higher
the position of any given competitor the more he
pushes down the positions of those below him. In
the case of the Olympic Games, a country that has
won more medals or obtained better medals auto-
matically makes other DMUs not to win those
medals, i.e., makes them lose output units.
To take this point in consideration, a new
model is proposed. Its theoretical development is
the object of the next section.
3. Zero sum gains DEA model
The ZSG-DEA assumes that the sum of outputs
is constant. This is similar to a zero sum game in
which whatever is won by a player is lost by one or
more of the others.
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The model is represented in the general set of
expressions (II), in which DMU0 is the object unit
that is attempting to increase its output. Thus, hR0
is the reciprocal of the DMU0 eﬃciency under
ZSG-DEA; xj are the original inputs values; yj are
the original outputs values; y0 and x0 are the out-
put and input values for DMU0; y0j are the new
outputs of the other DMUs resulting from the loss
of outputs caused by DMU0s gains; kj is the share
deﬁned in Section 2; z represents how much DMU0
should gain to reach the eﬃcient frontier;
kj; hR0; y0j ¼ fjðhR0Þ are the decision variables.
max hR0
s:t:
X
j
kjxj6 x0
hR0y06
X
j
kjy0jX
j
kj ¼ 1
kj P 0
ðIIÞ
There are diﬀerent solutions for this problem
depending on the deﬁnitions of functions y 0j ¼
fjðhR0Þ. One case in which the frontier does not
change is one in which the object DMU wins units
of lost output by DMUs that are not in the fron-
tier. In other words, y0j ¼ yj; 8DMUj 2 efficient
frontier. However, this is a strategy that severely
limits DMU0s ability to fulﬁl its target, i.e., to
reach the frontier of eﬃciency.
Two other strategies to reach the target and
their mathematical representation will be pre-
sented here below: a strategy that assumes equal
reductions of output for all DMUs and a strategy
in which the output reduction in each DMU is
proportional to the DMUs very output. Algebraic
representation of these two strategies applies to
the general model without weight restrictions. The
ZSG-DEA model with weight restrictions will be
presented in Section 4.
3.1. Equal output reduction strategy for all DMUs
j; j 6¼ 0
Fig. 1 shows a segment of two eﬃcient frontiers.
The upper line indicates the frontier of the tradi-
tional model; the lower line indicates the new fron-
tier if all DMUs undergo an equal reduction of out-
put with the exception of DMU0, which, to become
eﬃcient, wins the sum of the losses of the others.
As the distance to frontier in the ZSG-DEA
model is shorter than the distance to the frontier
in the traditional DEA model, the DMU0s ZSG-
DEA eﬃciency is higher than the traditional one.
To represent this strategy we start with the
general model set of expressions (II), in which the
DMU0s output is y0. The outputs of the other
ðn 1Þ DMUs are Y  y0, in which Y is the sum of
all available outputs for all DMUs.
Thus, DMU0 would need to win z units
of output and every other DMUj, j 6¼ 0, would
lose z=ðn 1Þ output units. Therefore, y0j ¼ yj 
ðz=n 1Þ.
Fig. 1 shows that the gain of DMU0 is z ¼
hRy0  y0. Substituting the values of y0j and z in (II),
the model that represents the equal output reduc-
tion strategy is obtained (III).
max hR0
s:t:
X
j
kjxj6 x0
hR0y06
X
j
kj yj

 y0ðhR0  1Þ
n 1

X
j
kj ¼ 1
kj P 0
ðIIIÞ
The term y0ðhR0  1Þ=n 1 represents the loss
that each DMUj, j 6¼ 0, must have for DMU0 to
win z ¼ y0ðhR0  1Þ output units.
O
I
o
hoyo
yo
z
hRoyo
Fig. 1. Graphical representation of the equal output reduction
strategy for all DMUs j; j 6¼ 0.
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This strategy has the following drawbacks:
1. It is a non-linear programming problem (the
second constraint is a multiplication of the
two decision variables kj and hR0: hR0y06P
j kjðyj  ðy0ðhR0  1Þ=n 1ÞÞ).
2. This strategy might cause some DMUs to have
a negative output. So, this strategy can only be
used in the cases when ðz=n 1Þ6 minðyjÞ.
Clearly, this is not the case of the Olympic
Games as there are DMUs with low output
such as, for instance, the eﬃcient DMU Mace-
donia that won only a bronze medal.
To avoid this drawback, a new strategy that
reduces the losses in proportion to the original
output is proposed.
3.2. Proportional output reduction strategy for all
DMUs j; j 6¼ 0
To fulﬁl this strategy, DMU0 needs to win z
output units and the losses of the other DMUs are
proportional to their levels of output, i.e., the
lower the level of output the lower the loss and
vice-versa. The condition that the sum of the losses
is equal to the gains of DMU0 is still in force (the
sum of outputs is constant).
Fig. 2 represents the new frontier created by this
strategy. The thin line indicates the frontier of the
traditional model; the bold line indicates the new
frontier if all DMUs undergo a proportional re-
duction of output with the exception of DMU0
which wins the sum of the losses of the others to
achieve eﬃciency.
Fig. 3 shows what proportional reduction
would mean in the case of three DMUs. DMUs A
and B have a high level of output, respectively a
and b. Let c be the level of output of DMU C. For
DMU C to become eﬃcient, it must have an out-
put gain of d units, thus reaching the ðcþ dÞ level.
Consequently, DMUs A and B lose output units a
and b, which are respectively proportional to the
initial a and b levels, their output levels going
down, consequently, to ða aÞ and ðb bÞ.
From Fig. 3 and making losses proportional to
output, comes a=a ¼ b=b. As gains must be equal to
the sum of losses, we have a þ b ¼ d. Algebraic ma-
nipulation renders a ¼ ad=aþ b (DMUAs loss of
output) and b ¼ bd=aþ b (DMUBs loss of output).
In general terms, the loss of output for any
given DMUj, j 6¼ 0, becomes yjz=
P
j 6¼0 yj. As z ¼
y0ðhR0  1Þ, the loss of output of DMUj is
yjy0ðhR0  1Þ=
P
j 6¼0 yj.
Substituting this expression in the general
model (II), model (IV) for the proportional output
reduction strategy can be written.
max hR0
s:t:
X
j
kjxj6 x0
hR0y06
X
j
kjyj 1
 
 y0ðhR0  1ÞP
j 6¼0 yj
!
X
j
kj ¼ 1
kj P 0
ðIVÞ
O
I
o
hoyo
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Fig. 2. Graphical representation of proportional output re-
duction strategy for all DMUs j.
b-β
β
a-α
α
c
a
b
δ
c+δ
Fig. 3. Segment of an eﬃcient frontier with the projection of
DMU C, and proportional output reduction strategy for
DMUs A and B.
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Term 1 ðy0ðhR0  1Þ=
P
j 6¼0 yjÞ shall be called
the reduction coeﬃcient (RC).
Due to the constraint
hR0y06
X
j
kjyj 1
 
 y0ðhR0  1ÞP
j 6¼0 yj
!
this is still a non-linear programming problem.
Besides, in real conditions there may be DMUs
from which no proportional quantity of output
can be extracted. A case in point in the last
Olympic Games was Mozambique that won a
gold medal but nothing else. In similar cases,
strategies must be deﬁned to withdraw an arbi-
trary number of units of output.
Non-linearity is not a diﬃculty in this case.
Both in ZSG and traditional models the eﬃcient
frontier contains the same DMUs. On the other
hand, for any DMU that does not belong to the
DMU0 reference set, kj ¼ 0. So, the number of
variables becomes rather small and, in some cases,
the problem can be solved analytically with the use
of diﬀerential calculus tools.
4. The ZSG-DEA model applied to the Olympic
Games
4.1. ZSG-DEA model with weight restrictions
The previous paragraph makes it possible to
establish a ZSG-DEA model that incorporates
weight restrictions to the number of gold, silver
and bronze medals that were won. The combi-
nation of models (I) and (IV) begets model (V)
whose solution produces an Olympic ranking in
which output reduction is proportional to its
level.
max hR0
s:t:
X
j
kjxPOPj6xPOP0X
j
kjxGDPj6xGDP0
hR0yG06
X
j
kjyGj 1
 
 yG0ðhR01ÞP
j 6¼0 yGj
!
 c1
hR0yS06
X
j
kjySj 1
 
 yS0ðhR01ÞP
j 6¼0 ySj
!
þ c1 c2
hR0yB06
X
j
kjyBj 1
 
 yB0ðhR01ÞP
j6¼0 yBj
!
þ c2X
j
kj ¼ 1
kj;c1;c2P0
ðVÞ
Table 1 shows the eﬃciencies measured by this
model for DMUs Brazil, The Netherlands and
Kenya.
To obtain results in this model is very laborious
owing to its non-linearity and large number of
variables. The model would be greatly simpliﬁed if
only one output existed. For the Olympic Games
this means that the number of medals has to be
condensed in one meaningful indicator only.
The theoretical considerations applicable to a
single output ZSG-DEA model are shown herein
below.
4.2. Single output ZSG-DEA model solution
For a single output ZSG-DEA proportional
reduction strategy model the following theorem
can be proven.
Theorem. The target for a DMU to reach the effi-
ciency frontier in a ZSG-DEA proportional output
reduction strategy model equals the same target in
the traditional DEA BCC model multiplied by the
reduction coefficient.
The theorem is represented by Eq. (VI), in
which j
 is the DMU0 reference set, k


j and h


0 are
the optimal solutions of the traditional output
oriented DEA BCC model.
Table 1
Results for some DMUs measured by the ZSG-DEA model
with weight restrictions
DMU Eﬃciency (%)
Brazil 14.62
The Netherlands 85.56
Kenya 24.51
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hR0y0 ¼
X
j

k
j yj 1
 
 y0ðhR0  1ÞP
j 6¼0 yj
!
¼ h
0y0 1
 
 y0ðhR0  1ÞP
j 6¼0 yj
!
ðVIÞ
Proof. From the reduction/gain diagram shown in
Fig. 4 and the similarities of triangles ACd and
ABe, shown in Fig. 5(a), as well as those of tri-
angles, A0C0d 0 and A0B0e0, shown in Fig. 5(b), the
following relationships
yB  yA
yC  yA ¼
xB  xA
xC  xA and
y 0B  y0A
y 0C  y0A
¼ xB  xA
xC  xA
can be deducted. From these ratios it follows that
yB  yA
yC  yA ¼
y0B  y0A
y 0C  y 0A
As y 0B ¼ RCyB and y0A ¼ RCyA, in which RC ¼
reduction coeﬃcient, 1=ðyCyAÞ¼RC=ðy0CRCyAÞ
is obtained. So, ðyCyAÞRC¼ y0CRCyA, or rather,
y0C¼RCyC. 
Although the proof has been carried out only
for two dimensions, it is easy to generalise for a
larger number of dimensions if orthogonal pro-
jections on the co-ordinated planes are used and
similarity ratios are applied to the resulting trian-
gles.
Corollary. In a ZSG-DEA model in which a pro-
portional output reduction strategy has been adop-
ted, the value of the DMUs j contribution ðkjÞ,
j 6¼ 0, equals its value in the traditional DEA model.
Proof. Consider the DMU0ðoutput ¼ y0Þ reference
set which comprehends p DMUs, with y1; y2; . . . ; yp
outputs. DMU0s target is h0y0 ¼ k1y1þ k2y2þ
   þ kpyp. Multiplying the equation by the reduc-
tion coeﬃcient RC, RCh0y0 ¼ RCk1y1þ RCk2y2þ
   þRCkpyp. From the preceding theorem hR0y0 ¼
k1y 01 þ k2y02 þ    þ kpy0p, and the corollary is
proved. 
yA
y A
yB
y B
A
B
C
C
xA xBxC
A
B
o
yC
I
O
Fig. 4. Output reduction (DMU0 references DMUs A and B)
and output gain ðDMU0Þ for the proportional output reduction
strategy.
yA
y A
yB
y B
C
xA xBxC
A
B
o
yC
yA
y A
yB
y B
A
BC
xA xBxC
o
yC
(a) (b)
d e
d e
Fig. 5. Triangle similarity ratios for the proportional output reduction strategy.
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4.3. Single output model used for Olympic rankings
It has already been mentioned that the aggre-
gation of the outputs ‘‘number of medals’’ into a
single indicator is required. This aggregation of
criteria deﬁnes the American Multicriteria School
(Keeney and Raiﬀa, 1976) and is easily obtainable
by means of a weighted sum in which the weights
are the measure of the importance of each type of
medal.
In Gomes et al. (2001), the weights were ob-
tained from the expression of the decision-makers
preferences. This is very arbitrary and, so, prefer-
ence was given to use the very DEA model to
obtain the weights. The DEA BCC model with
weight restrictions (Section 2) was used. The av-
erage of the weights that each DMU assigned to
each type of medal was calculated from this model.
To standardise procedures each weight was di-
vided by the sum of weights the DMU assigned to
each type of medal.
This approach has the advantage of being ob-
jective and, thus, it does not depend on experts
opinions. However, it does have the possible dis-
advantage of eﬃcient DMUs not having a single
set of optimal weights (Rosen et al., 1998; Soares
de Mello et al., 2001). This is not a serious disad-
vantage in this case as the number of eﬃcient
DMUs is small and, so, it has little inﬂuence in the
calculation of the average value. This technique
allows the three-output model to be replaced by a
single output model in which the aggregate output
is obtained from Eq. (VII).
single output ¼ 0:5814 goldþ 0:2437 silver
þ 0:1749 bronze ðVIIÞ
The use of this output prevents each DMU
from optimising its own weights. Despite this
drawback, it simpliﬁes the problem greatly. The
fact that the frontier it determines is the same as
found by model (I) further vindicates its use.
The use of the aggregate output, of the theorem
and its corollary make it possible for eﬃciency to be
determined from the classical DEA model and the
resolution of Eq. (VI) when the sum of gains is zero.
The ﬁnal Olympic ranking obtained from the
single output ZSG-DEA model is shown in Ap-
pendix A. It should be emphasised that the cal-
culation of these results requires the previous
calculation of the corresponding classical single
output DEA BCC model to determine reference
DMUs and their shares ðkÞ or eﬃciencies 1=h.
The results show that a number of countries are
tied at 100% eﬃciency. This is a common charac-
teristic of the majority of DEA models, in partic-
ular of the DEA BCC model. ZSG-DEA, as a
particular case of the DEA BCC model, suﬀers
from the same drawback. The literature provides
methods to overcome this diﬃculty (Adler et al.,
2002). Mention can be made of cross-evaluation
(Sexton et al., 1986; Doyle and Green, 1994), super
eﬃciency (Andersen and Petersen, 1993) and
benchmarking (Charnes et al., 1985), among others.
The latter states that the more an eﬃcient DMU is
chosen as a target by the ineﬃcient units, the better
it ranks. This means that those ineﬃcient DMUs
have similar properties to the eﬃcient one. Results
from this approach can be seen in Table 2.
Another property or DEA BCC model incor-
porated to the ZSG-DEA is that those DMUs with
the smallest input value and/or the biggest output
value are always eﬃcient (Ali, 1994). In our case
study, these DMUs are Barbados, Macedonia
(smallest inputs) and United States (biggest out-
put). In Table 2 it can be seen, indeed, that these
DMUs belong to the peer groups of a small
number of ineﬃcient DMUs.
It should also be pointed out that eﬃciencies
obtained from the multiple output ZSG-DEA
models with weight restrictions have lower values
than those obtained from the single output model.
Table 2
Ranking for the eﬃcient countries based on the benchmarking
method
Eﬃcient
DMU
Number of times the eﬃcient DMU appear
in the peer groups of the ineﬃcient ones
Australia 55
Cuba 50
Russia 35
Bahamas 34
Macedonia 5
United States 4
Barbados 0
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5. Conclusions
Olympic eﬃciency as analysed by DEA models
has been shown to be a useful tool to check whe-
ther each country has been obtaining results that
are compatible with its potentialities. It further
allows planning for realistic targets for future
Olympic Games. However, traditional models do
not take into consideration the limited number
of medals to be won and, thus, some reﬁnements
are required. The ZSG-DEA model, weight con-
strained or otherwise, and the proposed strate-
gies are the ﬁrst step to obtain more accurate
results.
The ZSG-DEA model with weight restrictions
is not at present as much developed as the single
aggregate output model. For this reason the latter
has been chosen to establish the ﬁnal ranking.
The following are only some of the future
developments that can be envisaged for ZSG-
DEA:
• Strategies for co-operation and competition
among ineﬃcient DMUs;
• Taking into account that the quantity of medals
is a integer leading to a non-linear and integer
programming problem;
• To determine a strategy that, besides maximis-
ing hR0, will also minimise z. This means deter-
mining the most eﬃcient strategy that can be
obtained from the adequate choice of the
fjðhR0Þ. In such a case maximisation will require
decision functions instead of decision variables
and that will require the use of a dynamic pro-
gramming problem. This strategy leads to a
DEA model conceptually diﬀerent from the ex-
isting ones, since the movement of an ineﬃcient
DMU towards the frontier will aﬀect its shape.
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Appendix A
Proposed ranking for winning medal countries
in Sidney 2000 Olympic Games
Country Gold Silver Bronze EffZSG-DEA  single output (%)
Australia 16 25 17 100.00
Cuba 11 11 7 100.00
Russia 32 28 28 100.00
Bahamas 1 1 0 100.00
Macedonia 0 0 1 100.00
United States 39 25 33 100.00
Barbados 0 0 1 100.00
Romania 0 4 3 76.20
Norway 11 6 9 74.59
China 4 3 3 73.05
Germany 28 16 15 71.05
Hungary 14 17 26 68.56
The Netherlands 8 6 3 63.93
France 12 9 4 60.14
Bulgaria 13 14 11 59.55
Yugoslavia 5 6 2 58.85
Italy 1 1 1 55.39
Estonia 13 8 13 52.10
Slovenia 1 0 2 48.61
United Kingdom 2 0 0 47.34
Belarus 11 10 7 45.50
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Country Gold Silver Bronze EffZSG-DEA  single output (%)
Sweden 3 3 11 45.12
Jamaica 4 5 3 44.65
Lithuania 2 0 3 44.31
South Korea 8 9 11 43.62
Greece 4 6 3 42.09
Ukraine 3 10 10 39.63
Denmark 2 3 1 36.74
Latvia 1 1 1 36.13
Poland 6 5 3 32.38
Switzerland 1 6 2 31.84
Moldova 0 1 1 30.51
Ethiopia 4 1 3 30.12
Finland 2 1 1 29.12
Slovakia 1 3 1 27.61
New Zealand 1 0 3 26.86
Czech Republic 2 3 3 24.65
Trinidad & Tobago 0 1 1 24.55
Kazakhstan 3 4 0 23.76
Kenya 2 3 2 22.16
Iceland 3 3 8 21.24
Georgia 0 0 6 21.00
Canada 0 0 1 20.91
Azerbaijan 2 0 1 18.73
Spain 2 1 0 17.39
Austria 1 0 1 17.07
Croatia 3 3 5 16.76
Qatar 0 0 1 15.70
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 1 11.53
Cameroon 1 0 0 10.82
Algeria 1 1 3 10.44
Mozambique 0 2 3 10.18
Iran 3 0 1 10.11
Belgium 1 0 0 10.05
Uzbekistan 1 1 2 9.99
Turkey 0 6 6 9.49
Costa Rica 0 0 2 9.12
Brazil 3 0 1 8.97
Morocco 0 0 1 8.39
Kuwait 0 1 4 8.04
North Korea 1 2 3 7.24
Uruguay 0 1 3 6.91
Mexico 0 1 0 6.77
South Africa 1 3 2 6.03
Nigeria 0 1 0 6.03
Ireland 5 8 5 6.02
Indonesia 0 3 0 5.99
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Country Gold Silver Bronze EffZSG-DEA  single output (%)
Japan 0 2 3 5.76
Taiwan 0 2 2 5.34
Armenia 0 0 1 4.74
Argentina 0 1 4 4.73
Thailand 1 0 2 4.64
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Colombia 0 0 2 3.58
Saudi Arabia 0 0 1 2.93
Israel 0 1 1 2.87
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